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## Democratic Backsliding in West Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Historical Legacies and Institutional Fragility in Burkina Faso, Gabon, and Niger

Ibrahim Abubakar Lajada \* , Abdulaziz Abubakar Galadima, Enikansaye Adebawale Martins

Department Under Global Studies, Washington University, St. Louis, United States

Department of Business Administration, National Open University of Nigeria

Department of Political Science, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba, Akoko, Ondo State, Nigeria

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### Abstract

This research examines the ongoing democratic decline in three West African nations—Burkina Faso, Gabon, and Niger—that have experienced significant setbacks despite the democratic progress made during the 1990s regional liberalization wave. These countries have suffered from authoritarian regression, military coups, and widespread citizen disillusionment, even after establishing multiparty systems and pursuing constitutional reforms. Using a historical-institutionalist framework and combining qualitative and quantitative methods, the study analyzed data from Afrobarometer surveys and democratic indices from V-Dem and Freedom House to assess the scope of democratic challenges and reform potential. The findings reveal that deeply rooted authoritarian traditions, weak state institutions, and socio-cultural factors like clientelist political networks have systematically obstructed democratic development, creating reinforcing patterns of political dysfunction where elite manipulation and institutional weakness persist as dominant features. While the research identifies some encouraging modernization trends, including growing political awareness among youth and increased civic engagement in urban areas, these positive developments remain overshadowed by structural impediments. The study concludes that without comprehensive structural transformation and meaningful citizen empowerment, sustainable democratic consolidation will remain out of reach for these nations, though potential pathways exist through youth activism, constitutional reform, and enhanced regional oversight mechanisms.

### Keywords:

Authoritarian Legacies, Civil-military Relations, Democratic Backsliding, West Africa

## 1 Introduction

### *Background of the Study*

The intersection of neo-colonial economic structures, institutionalized neo-patrimonial systems, Cold War geopolitical dynamics, and authoritarian leadership—whose primary motivation centered on personal enrichment rather than public service—established the foundational barriers to democratization across West Africa during the early post-independence era. These factors created conditions enabling political power concentration among limited elites, civil society subordination, and prioritization of development rhetoric over genuine support for marginalized populations. While these characterizations remain relevant, they have become increasingly inadequate for explaining the comprehensive scope of democratic challenges within the region. The complex and evolving nature of contemporary political dynamics has generated democratic problems that transcend traditional post-colonial analytical frameworks.

The optimism accompanying the global political liberalization movement of the early 1990s was significant. The removal of entrenched autocratic leaders who had maintained power for decades occurred through combined internal democratic pressures and shifting international dynamics, leading to multiparty system emergence across much of West Africa, including electoral competition and institutional reform initiatives that ultimately proved insufficient. These transformations were supported by modernization trends and evolving public preferences, reflected in growing popular support for civil liberties, political

participation, and governmental responsiveness as documented through Afrobarometer surveys (Logan & Mattes, 2010). The prevailing narrative suggested the world was progressing steadily toward democratic consolidation.

This optimism proved premature. Despite adopting formal democratic procedures—including term limitations, independent judicial systems, and anti-corruption institutions—these reforms were undermined by existing patronage networks established during single-party rule periods. The clientelist and elite-dominated systems identified by Bratton and van de Walle (1997) seamlessly integrated into newly democratized regimes, subverting reform substance while preserving reform appearance. Political elites consistently manipulated institutional mechanisms to maintain power and avoid accountability while consolidating opposition resistance.

Additionally, struggles over political representation and economic integration were complicated by persistent cultural and ethnic divisions, which colonial boundary-drawing processes had historically amplified, alongside resource and wealth distribution challenges. These unresolved tensions, combined with weak rule of law and insufficient civil rights protection, have consistently contributed to regional democratic failures. Democratic transformation in this context represents an unfulfilled promise, constrained not only by historical legacies but also by contemporary political circumstances.

This paper seeks to examine these dynamics comprehensively, evaluating how combinations of

historical, institutional, and socio-cultural obstacles have impeded democratic progress within select West African states. The study employs mixed-methods analysis within historical institutionalism and cultural relativism theoretical frameworks.

African democratization has been shaped by multifaceted impacts from historical processes, institutional arrangements, and socio-political elements that resist democratic development efforts. Despite post-Cold War optimism that generated significant regime transitions and autocratic system collapse toward genuine democracies, subsequent years have revealed uneven and limited progress toward continental democratic consolidation. Colonial rule and authoritarian governance histories have not only obscured African democratization processes but contemporary conditions continue generating profound continental impacts, including poverty, ethnic fragmentation, institutional instability, and neo-patrimonial political practice proliferation.

#### *Historical Foundations and Colonial Disruptions*

Colonial experiences fundamentally shaped the historical contexts within which African democracy operates. Colonial regimes inherently embodied exclusionary and authoritarian characteristics, prioritizing administrative control and resource extraction over participatory governance development. These systems disrupted indigenous political arrangements and established arbitrary boundaries that divided ethnic groups and prevented coherent national identity formation (Mamdani, 1996). Centralized authoritarian control, despotic governance, and indirect rule systems became the

institutional legacy inherited by post-independence African leaders, many of whom reinforced rather than dismantled these systems.

The rapid emergence of single-party states, military dictatorships, and clientelist networks therefore characterized post-colonial African governance, creating obstacles to democratic institutional and cultural development. The democratic momentum following the Cold War's end in the early 1990s appeared to counteract these established patterns. However, as Adejumobi (2000) observed, most African nations adopted democratic institutional forms (constitutions, electoral commissions, parliaments) without incorporating authentic democratic substance.

#### *The Post-Cold War Democratic Wave*

Democratization accelerated during the early 1990s across sub-Saharan Africa due to combined civil society pressure and Western conditional aid that challenged military dictatorships. This period witnessed multiparty election establishment, liberal media environment creation, and constitutional reforms designed to limit executive authority. Yet as Bratton and van de Walle (1997) argue, these changes were primarily procedural rather than substantive, as existing power structures demonstrated significant resistance to genuine reform despite increased electoral competition.

However, the anticipated benefits of purported democratization—including governance transformation and enhanced rule of law and human rights protection—failed to materialize across most African countries. Democratic inadequacy has been most evident in hybrid regime persistence, where

elections occur alongside systematic manipulation, state repression, and institutional capture (Levitsky & Way, 2002).

### *Democratic Regression in West Africa*

West Africa exemplifies the democratic regression and stagnation experienced continentally. While countries like Ghana and Senegal have maintained relative democratic stability, others including Nigeria, Mali, Guinea, and Côte d'Ivoire have performed poorly. Recent military coups in Mali (2020), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) represent returns to authoritarian governance under the justification of restoring national order (Fayemi, 2021).

The Nigerian example demonstrates how fragile consolidation remains within Africa's most populous nation and largest economy. Despite civilian rule transition in 1999, the country continues experiencing electoral irregularities, ethno-religious conflicts, systemic corruption, and inadequate institutional checks and balances. Similarly, Côte d'Ivoire's democratic engagement has been characterized by political exclusion and electoral violence, exemplified by the 2010-2011 crisis that revealed deep political and social divisions.

These challenges indicate deeper structural failures, including diminished confidence in democratic institutions, identity politics instrumentalization, and state inability to provide basic public services. This suggests that democratization processes are often disconnected from broader development and governance objectives.

### *Institutional Weaknesses and External Influences*

Weak state institutions represent a primary obstacle to African democratic consolidation. Electoral commissions frequently lack independence and resources for credible election delivery, judicial systems remain vulnerable to executive manipulation, and legislatures function as extensions of ruling parties rather than oversight bodies. Institutional weakness undermines democratic accountability and facilitates authoritarian tendencies.

External actor influence has been simultaneously inconsistent and counterproductive. While donors have supported democratization through electoral assistance and civil society funding, they have also prioritized strategic interests including terrorism prevention, trade facilitation, and natural resource access at democracy's expense. These contradictions undermine external democracy support credibility while empowering leaders who exploit geopolitical divisions to resist reforms (Brown, 2005).

### *Political Clientelism and Neo-Patrimonialism*

Neo-patrimonialism continues constraining democracy across most African states. These systems feature personalized state power and resource distribution based on loyalty rather than merit or legal entitlement. This state-society integration creates clientelist networks that undermine rule of law and distort political competition (Cheeseman, 2015).

When confronting potential power loss, ruling elites manipulate constitutional provisions, co-opt opposition members, and employ state apparatus to suppress dissent. Constitutional term limit removal in Uganda and Rwanda exemplifies how

personalistic governance persists despite formally democratic systems.

### *Emerging Democratic Resilience*

Nevertheless, signs of continental democratic resilience are emerging. Civil society organizations and independent youth movements have increasingly demanded accountability and resisted authoritarian consolidation. Mass mobilization has played crucial roles in destabilizing entrenched powers and demanding democratic change in countries including Sudan and Burkina Faso.

Regional organizations, particularly the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have attempted strengthening democratic standards through election observation missions, diplomatic facilitation, and sanctions against unconstitutional power transfers. While these mechanisms demonstrate variable effectiveness, they represent important regional accountability developments.

Additionally, democratic governance enjoys substantial popular support. Afrobarometer survey results indicate that most African citizens strongly support democracy as their preferred government form and endorse political pluralism, civil liberties, and institutional reforms (Logan & Mattes, 2010). These popular attitudes provide fundamental foundations for democratic consolidation advancement.

### *Statement of the Research Problem*

Recent years have witnessed West Africa's alarming authoritarian regression, characterized by military

coup resurgence, constitutional manipulation, and democratic institution subversion. Countries including Burkina Faso, Gabon, and Niger, which had previously achieved democratization progress, have experienced political upheavals representing reversals of previously established democratic norms and values. These setbacks challenge regional democratic governance sustainability and raise fundamental questions regarding their causes and consequences.

Burkina Faso has experienced multiple coups within short timeframes due to their popularity amid widespread insecurity and governance failures. Similarly, military regimes have disrupted democracies in Gabon and Niger through coups and power entrenchment, indicating significant institutional weaknesses and elite dominance (Gyimah-Boadi, 2021; Cheeseman, 2015).

Although democratic frameworks became widespread during the 1990s across West African countries, numerous structural challenges related to authoritarian legacies, weak state institutions, electoral fraud, and external interference persist. Recurring unconstitutional power transitions indicate that democracy in these countries remains primarily procedural rather than substantive. Additionally, international and regional responses are typically fragmented, hindering overall progress toward democratic principle adherence (Gros, 2023).

This study seeks to critically examine political crises in Burkina Faso, Gabon, and Niger that exemplify democratic backsliding through both internal dynamics (governance failures and elite militarization) and external factors (foreign interests

and regional security concerns). Understanding these trends is essential for developing sustainable democratic solutions in West Africa.

### *Aim and Objectives of the Research*

This Democratic Research Project (DRP) aims to analyze ongoing obstacles to democratic consolidation in West Africa by examining three countries: Burkina Faso, Gabon, and Niger. The study pursues the following objectives:

1. To identify and analyze key historical, institutional, and cultural factors contributing to democratic erosion and regression in Burkina Faso, Gabon, and Niger since 1990s political liberalization began.
2. To develop a theoretical framework explaining how these barriers interact and mutually reinforce each other, collectively contributing to chronic democratic fragility despite observable political modernization and emerging democratic behaviors.
3. To evaluate prospects for meaningful democratic consolidation at both national and regional levels, considering identified obstacle strength and emerging reform opportunities.

### *Research Questions*

1. What historical, institutional, and cultural factors have contributed to democratic governance weakening in Burkina Faso, Gabon, and Niger since 1990s political liberalization began?

2. How do these factors interact and mutually reinforce each other to create chronic democratic fragility despite political modernization and emerging democratic behaviors?
3. What are the prospects for meaningful democratic consolidation in Burkina Faso, Gabon, and Niger at both national and regional levels, considering identified barriers and potential democratic reform opportunities?

### *Research Hypotheses*

**H<sub>1</sub>:** Historical authoritarian rule legacies, weak institutional frameworks, and entrenched cultural-political norms significantly contribute to persistent democratic backsliding observed in Burkina Faso, Gabon, and Niger.

**H<sub>2</sub>:** The interaction between institutional weaknesses, socio-political instability, and historical authoritarian practices reinforces democratic fragility, despite political modernization signs and increased citizen engagement.

**H<sub>3</sub>:** Prospects for democratic consolidation in Burkina Faso, Gabon, and Niger remain limited unless structural reforms address the combined effects of historical, institutional, and cultural barriers at both national and regional levels.

## 2 Literature Review

### *Conceptual Clarification*

This section establishes key definitional foundations for the study. Democracy is defined as governance based on popular will through free elections, rule of law, political pluralism, and accountable institutions (Diamond, 2019), though West African practice often falls short of these ideals. Democratic backsliding represents the gradual erosion of democratic norms and institutions through legal and political means rather than sudden breakdowns (Luhmann & Lindberg, 2019). Political crisis encompasses extreme institutional disorder including electoral disputes, governance failures, and military interventions. Institutional fragility describes weakness in core democratic institutions—judiciary, legislature, electoral bodies—making them vulnerable to elite manipulation (Norris, 2021). Democratic consolidation occurs when democracy becomes "the only game in town," requiring strong institutions, active civil society, and smooth leadership transitions (Schedler, 2001). These concepts provide analytical clarity for examining the superficial democratization versus substantive institutional weakness characteristic of the study countries.

### *Historical Trajectory of Democratization in West Africa*

#### *Post-Independence Political Evolution*

The immediate post-independence period (1950s-1960s) saw initial democratic constitutions quickly abandoned for single-party rule and military dictatorships. New governments lacked institutional

capacity, economic resources, and national cohesion, with ethnic divisions exacerbated by colonial boundary-drawing making governance difficult. Military coups became routine regime change mechanisms, with countries like Burkina Faso experiencing multiple takeovers. Political institutions served elite consolidation rather than public accountability, creating authoritarian legacies that would persist through later democratization attempts (Agyeman-Duah, 2005).

### *The 1990s Wave of Liberalization and Multiparty Systems*

The Cold War's end triggered political liberalization across West Africa as authoritarian governments lost superpower backing and donors made aid conditional on political reform. National conferences in countries like Benin and Mali facilitated transitions to multiparty systems and competitive elections. However, democratization was largely procedural—while elections occurred, entrenched elites maintained power through state patronage, electoral manipulation, and opposition intimidation. This "façade democracy" provided legitimacy while preserving autocratic control, setting the stage for subsequent backsliding (Levitsky & Way, 2010).

### *Colonial Legacies in Democratic Institution-Shaping*

European colonial administration in Francophone countries like Gabon, Niger, and Burkina Faso emphasized centralized, extractive governance focused on resource control rather than democratic culture development. Assimilation and association policies restricted local political autonomy,

producing post-colonial states with top-down administrative systems lacking participatory governance traditions. Presidential systems with weak legislatures and courts replicated colonial centralization patterns. Arbitrary boundary-drawing and ethnic favoritism created divisions that post-independence elites exploited for political gain, while weak plural institutions left governments unprepared for competitive democracy (Mamdani, 1996; Young, 2004).

### *Theoretical Perspectives on Democratic Backsliding: Definitions, Typologies, and Conceptual Frameworks*

Democratic backsliding involves incremental erosion of democratic institutions and norms from within, contrasting with sudden breakdowns like military coups. Scholars identify three main mechanisms: executive aggrandizement (legal dismantling of checks and balances), promissory coups (military intervention promising democratic restoration), and strategic electoral manipulation (gerrymandering, voter suppression, media control). The V-Dem autocratization index measures regression across key variables including freedom of expression, judicial independence, and electoral integrity, enabling tracking of gradual deterioration within formally democratic states (Bermeo, 2016; V-Dem Institute, 2023).

### *Autocratization Versus Hybrid Regimes*

Autocratization systematically removes democratic governance elements while concentrating power in executive or ruling elite hands, occurring either suddenly (coups) or gradually (institutional

manipulation). Hybrid regimes occupy the gray zone between democracy and authoritarianism, mixing democratic forms (elections, constitutions) with authoritarian practices (repression, corruption, censorship). "Competitive authoritarianism" allows opposition participation but under uneven conditions favoring incumbents. These regimes persist in post-transition societies where institutional reforms remain incomplete and democratic norms lack internalization, as seen in West African countries conducting elections without credible oversight (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018).

### *Global and African Scholarly Contributions*

Global scholarship on democratic backsliding emphasizes internal destruction by elected leaders who undermine institutions, break informal norms, and increase polarization (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). African contributions highlight state fragility, colonial legacies, and neopatrimonial governance as factors sustaining authoritarian tendencies. Afrobarometer data reveals citizen dissatisfaction with electoral integrity, corruption, and judicial independence across the continent. Organizations like the Mo Ibrahim Foundation provide comparative governance indicators demonstrating that African democratic backsliding reflects broader institutional and socioeconomic weaknesses rather than isolated political reversals (Gyimah-Boadi & Logan, 2023).

### *Institutional Fragility and Governance Deficits*

#### *Weak Democratic Institutions and Vulnerability*

West African democratic institutions often emerged from donor pressure or peace settlements rather than

organic political evolution, lacking autonomy, capacity, and legitimacy. Electoral commissions face underfunding and executive dependence, leading to bias claims. Courts lack independence and professional capacity to handle disputes impartially or check high-ranking officials. Legislatures function as rubber-stamps rather than oversight bodies. This institutional weakness enables manipulation and capture, as seen in Gabon where courts consistently favor the ruling regime despite fraud allegations (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997; Levitsky & Way, 2010).

#### *Corruption, Electoral Malpractice, and Rule of Law*

Systemic corruption undermines citizen trust and creates flawed policymaking environments in countries like Burkina Faso and Niger, which consistently rank poorly on corruption indices. Electoral malpractices including vote buying, ballot stuffing, and intimidation characterize elections in Gabon and other study countries. Rule of law erosion allows political elites to escape accountability while law enforcement targets opponents selectively. When legal systems appear biased or corrupt, they lose mediating capacity and contribute to instability, creating conditions where extra-legal solutions like coups appear justified (Transparency International, 2022; Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018).

#### *Political Elites Undermining Accountability*

Political elites prioritize personal/sectional interests over institutional accountability through constitutional manipulation, term limit removal, and opposition co-optation. Elite capture involves controlling media, co-opting civil society, and using

patronage networks to maintain power, as demonstrated by the Bongo family's five-decade rule in Gabon. Elite strategies emphasize zero-sum competition rather than democratic accommodation, with governments using national security charges against opponents to discourage pluralism. This elite-driven norm erosion creates environments where military actors can present themselves as neutral arbiters, contributing to coup cycles (Posner & Young, 2007; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019).

#### *Civil-Military Relations and Return of Coups*

##### *Historical and Contemporary Military Intervention Patterns*

Military intervention dominated West African politics post-independence, with over 80 successful/attempted coups in sub-Saharan Africa between 1960-2000. Military actors positioned themselves as corrective forces against civilian government failures, becoming primary political actors in countries like Niger and Burkina Faso. Coup frequency declined in early 2000s due to democratization trends and stronger international anti-coup norms enforced by ECOWAS and AU protocols. However, 2020-2023 witnessed coup resurgence in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Gabon, indicating civilian control breakdown and democratic system defects (McGowan, 2003; IDEA, 2023).

##### *Security Challenges and Public Support for Military Rule*

Sahel security crises, particularly jihadist insurgencies in Burkina Faso and Niger, created conditions favoring military intervention when

civilian governments appeared ineffective. Afrobarometer data shows greater public confidence in military versus civilian leaders in affected countries. Recent coups received popular support, with citizens celebrating military takeovers as solutions to security and governance failures. However, military rule typically fails to address underlying problems while creating legitimacy, isolation, and capacity challenges, as demonstrated by Mali's deteriorating post-coup situation (Afrobarometer, 2023; Human Rights Watch, 2024).

### *Analysis of Recent Coups in Study Countries*

Burkina Faso experienced rapid military leadership turnover (Damiba ousting Kaboré in January 2022, then Traoré ousting Damiba in October 2022) citing security failures, illustrating military factionalism and absence of coherent governance agendas. Niger's 2023 coup against internationally-respected President Bazoum represented significant regional democratic setback, drawing ECOWAS intervention threats but maintaining local support fueled by anti-French sentiment. Gabon's 2023 coup immediately following disputed elections ended five decades of Bongo family rule, celebrated by citizens despite concerns about military-led democratic transitions. These cases highlight authoritarian roots and citizen frustration with rigged political systems (Al Jazeera, 2023; BBC, 2023; Freedom House, 2023).

### *Regional and International Influences on Democratic Stability*

#### *Role of ECOWAS, African Union, and Foreign Powers*

ECOWAS protocols prohibit unconstitutional government changes and have supported democratic restoration through interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Gambia, though effectiveness remains limited by internal divisions and resource constraints. The African Union's Charter on Democracy requires suspending non-compliant member states, but enforcement has been uneven with reactive rather than proactive responses. Foreign powers significantly impact regional democratic stability—France's declining influence amid anti-colonial sentiment, while Russia gains ground through security partnerships and Wagner Group presence, complicating democratization by providing alternatives to Western democracy promotion models (Bah, 2022; Ramani, 2023).

### *Sanctions Effectiveness and Democratic Breakdown Responses*

ECOWAS sanctions (travel bans, asset freezes, trade restrictions) following coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger showed mixed results. While some transitional authorities signed roadmaps, others delayed indefinitely or expelled ECOWAS representatives, indicating declining bloc authority. Niger's case demonstrated sanctions' limitations when juntas invoke sovereignty and popular support, with humanitarian consequences affecting ordinary citizens more than coup leaders. Inconsistent application undermines credibility—forceful responses to military coups contrast with silence on constitutional manipulation by civilian leaders, creating bias perceptions (Ojo, 2023; Amnesty International, 2023).

## *Global Democracy Promotion Versus Geopolitical Interests*

Western democracy promotion through electoral support, institution-building, and civil society funding faces obstacles from poor domestic ownership and elite resistance. Geopolitical competition increasingly compromises democracy promotion when strategic interests (counterterrorism, resource access) take precedence over governance standards. France and the US sometimes prioritized security cooperation over human rights in countries like Niger. Rising authoritarian powers like China and Russia offer economic investment and diplomatic support regardless of democratic credentials, providing alternatives to Western conditional assistance and undermining democracy promotion effectiveness (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014; Freedom House, 2023).

### **3 Methodology**

This study employed a historical-institutionalist research design utilizing mixed methods to examine democratic erosion in three West African countries. The approach combined qualitative archival research with quantitative analysis of democracy indices from established sources including V-Dem, Freedom House, and Afrobarometer surveys spanning from 1995 to 2023. Archival materials encompassed political speeches, constitutional debates, transitional reports, and national conference records from the 1990s liberalization period onward,

providing historical context for understanding democratic processes and elite resistance patterns.

Data analysis followed a thematic coding strategy structured around four primary themes: historical legacies (authoritarian continuities, "Big Man" politics, colonial administrative models), external constraints (geopolitical influences, foreign aid conditionality), institutional continuities (centralized executive powers, weak horizontal accountability), and modern socioeconomic grievances (ethnic divisions, regional marginalization, economic exclusion). The triangulation of archival evidence with longitudinal democracy indicators ensured robust validity, while the historical-institutionalist framework enabled examination of path dependencies and how past political arrangements continue to shape contemporary democratic outcomes.

### **4 Results**

#### *Historical, Institutional, and Cultural Factors Undermining Democracy*

The analysis revealed that democratic regression in all three countries stems from the persistence of authoritarian legacies that were masked rather than eliminated during 1990s liberalization. Political elites successfully manipulated formal democratic reforms to maintain power through constitutional amendments, electoral control, and institutional capture.

Table 1: Summary of Authoritarian Legacies in Case Study Countries

Country	Key Authoritarian Legacy	Duration of Dominance	Mode of Persistence
Burkina Faso	Blaise Compaoré's military-civilian regime	1987-2014	Constitutional amendments, electoral control
Gabon	Bongo dynasty (Omar and Ali Bongo)	1967-2023	Dynastic succession, ruling party monopoly
Niger	Recurrent military coups and unstable transitions	Coups in 1996, 1999, 2010, 2023	Constitutional suspensions, elite pacts

Democracy indices consistently showed institutional weakness across all three countries, with V-Dem electoral democracy scores remaining below 0.40 (indicating low democratic performance) and Freedom House classifications of "Not Free" or "Partly Free" throughout the study period.

Table 2: Institutional Democracy Scores (1995-2023)

Country	Electoral Democracy Index (V-Dem 2023)	Freedom House Score (2023)	Notes on Institutional Weaknesses
Burkina Faso	0.36 (Low)	28/100 (Not Free)	Weak judiciary; collapse of civilian authority due to insecurity
Gabon	0.28 (Very Low)	21/100 (Not Free)	Executive dominance; politicized judiciary
Niger	0.30 (Low)	35/100 (Partly Free)	Frequent constitutional disruptions

Interaction of Barriers and Democratic Fragility

The study identified a cyclical reinforcement mechanism where historical, institutional, and

cultural barriers compound each other. Historical authoritarian legacies created weak institutions, which failed to establish democratic norms, leading to cultural practices that prioritize patron-client relationships over democratic accountability.

Table 3: Interaction of Barriers in Undermining Democracy

Barrier Type	Characteristics	Reinforced By	Impact on Democracy
Historical Legacy	Authoritarian rule, dynastic politics, postcolonial centralism	Lack of transitional justice, elite continuity	Delegitimizes liberal institutions
Institutional Weakness	Politicized judiciary, weak legislature, executive dominance	Historical centralization, lack of constitutional enforcement	Undermines accountability, fosters manipulation
Cultural Dynamics	Patron-client politics, ethnic favoritism, traditional reverence	Institutional failure, low civic education	Hinders democratic engagement and meritocratic politics

Despite political modernization indicators—including increased urban support for democratic values (67% in Burkina Faso, 69% in Niger according to Afrobarometer 2023)—institutional performance remained poor, creating a paradox where democratic aspirations coexisted with support for military interventions when civilian governments failed to deliver security and good governance.

Table 4: Modernization Indicators vs. Institutional Performance

Country	Urban Support for Democracy (Afrobarometer 2023)	Institutional Integrity Score (V-Dem 2023)	Gap Identified
Burkina Faso	67%	0.36 (Low)	Democratic aspirations unmet by weak systems
Gabon	54%	0.28 (Very Low)	Disillusionment despite pluralistic rhetoric
Niger	69%	0.30 (Low)	Support for coups despite democratic ideals

Prospects for Democratic Consolidation

Assessment of consolidation prospects revealed that while structural obstacles remain formidable, emerging opportunities exist at both national and

regional levels. Civil society activism, particularly youth movements in urban areas, represents a potential catalyst for democratic renewal, as demonstrated in Burkina Faso's 2014 uprising and recent calls for constitutional reform in Gabon.

**Table 5: ECOWAS/AU Responses to Democratic Erosion**

Country	ECOWAS Action	AU Position	Effectiveness
Burkina Faso	Suspension; sanctions; mediation attempt	Suspension	Limited (no return to civilian rule)
Gabon	AU suspension; no ECOWAS membership	Condemnation	Yet to influence transitional roadmap
Niger	Suspension; threats of military intervention	Strong condemnation	Mixed; risk of regional escalation

Regional responses by ECOWAS and the African Union, while normatively important, showed inconsistent effectiveness due to limited enforcement mechanisms and competing national interests among member states.

## Discussion

The findings demonstrate that democratic backsliding in Burkina Faso, Gabon, and Niger represents not merely episodic failures but systematic manifestations of deeper structural contradictions inherited from colonial and early post-independence periods. The persistence of authoritarian legacies through formal democratic transitions aligns with van de Walle's (2001) thesis that African democratization often reproduces clientelistic and centralized governance patterns from previous autocratic regimes. However, this study extends beyond institutional analysis to reveal how these legacies interact with contemporary socio-political dynamics, creating recursive cycles that resist democratic consolidation even amid increasing democratic consciousness among citizens.

The paradox of modernization without democratization emerged as a critical finding, challenging linear assumptions about the

relationship between urbanization, education, and democratic development. While Afrobarometer data showed strong public support for democratic principles, the same populations often endorsed military interventions when civilian governments failed to provide security or effective governance. This contradiction reflects what Cheeseman (2020) describes as the gap between democratic demand and institutional supply, but our analysis suggests the problem runs deeper than institutional capacity—it involves fundamental questions about the social contract between state and society in post-colonial contexts.

The theoretical model of democratic fragility developed from this study reveals how historical institutionalism and cultural relativist perspectives can be synthesized to explain West African political trajectories. Unlike models that treat institutional weakness as a technical problem, our findings show that weak institutions are often the intended outcome of elite strategies designed to maintain informal power networks while satisfying external demands for democratic legitimacy. The Bongo dynasty's 56-year rule in Gabon exemplifies how formal democratic institutions can be captured and instrumentalized to serve dynastic interests, creating

what Levitsky and Way (2010) term "competitive authoritarianism" but with deeper historical roots than their framework suggests.

Regional responses to democratic erosion revealed both the potential and limitations of continental governance mechanisms. While ECOWAS and the African Union possess normative frameworks supporting democratic governance, their inconsistent application of sanctions and diplomatic pressure reflects broader tensions between sovereignty principles and democratic accountability. The contrasting responses to Niger's coup (strong condemnation and threats of intervention) versus tolerance for constitutional manipulation in other member states highlight how geopolitical interests often trump democratic principles. This selectivity undermines the credibility of regional institutions and creates perverse incentives for military actors who can present themselves as defenders of sovereignty against foreign interference.

The role of external actors in West African democratization processes emerged as particularly complex, involving tensions between democracy promotion rhetoric and strategic interests. France's declining influence in Francophone Africa, coupled with increasing Russian and Chinese engagement, has created a multipolar environment where military juntas can exploit great power rivalries to consolidate power while resisting democratization pressures. This dynamic challenges traditional assumptions about international democracy promotion and suggests that external support for democratic transitions may be less effective in contexts where global powers compete for influence through different governance models.

The prospects for democratic renewal, while constrained by structural barriers, are not entirely pessimistic. The study identified emerging opportunities in generational change, civil society mobilization, and transnational advocacy networks that operate across national boundaries. Youth-led movements in urban centers, digital activism, and demands for constitutional reform represent potential sources of democratic pressure that could eventually overwhelm elite resistance. However, realizing these opportunities requires addressing the fundamental contradictions between formal democratic institutions and informal power networks, suggesting that meaningful democratization in West Africa may require more radical institutional restructuring than previously assumed.

## **5 Conclusion**

This study concludes that democratic backsliding in Burkina Faso, Gabon, and Niger results from the complex interaction of historical authoritarian legacies, institutional fragilities, and socio-cultural dynamics that create self-reinforcing cycles of political dysfunction. While the 1990s liberalization introduced formal democratic procedures, it failed to dismantle underlying power structures, allowing political elites to manipulate democratic institutions for authoritarian purposes. The persistence of these patterns, despite growing democratic consciousness among citizens, suggests that meaningful democratic consolidation requires comprehensive structural reforms addressing not only institutional design but also the historical and cultural foundations of political authority. Regional mechanisms for democratic governance, while normatively

important, remain constrained by inconsistent application and competing geopolitical interests, highlighting the need for more robust and impartial continental governance frameworks that can effectively support democratic transitions and prevent authoritarian reversals.

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